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IN THE SUPRE~lli COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ALFRED BENNIE WILSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16198 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant appeals from a jury verdict 
finding him guilty of the offense of robbery. The 
defense of alibi was raised at trial. Subsequent to 
the taking of this appeal, defendant located an addition-
al witness to corroborate his defense. Defendant sub-
mitted her affidavit to the Court below in an attempt 
to obtain a writ of coram nobis mandating a new trial. 
The petition for the writ was dismissed. All proceedings 
were presided over before the Honorable George E. Ballif, 
District Judge. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On August 9, 1978, an information was filed in 
the Fourth Judicial District Court charging the appellant 
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with robbery, a violation of Section 76-3-301 (all 
statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended), unless otherwise noted. Appellant raised 
the defense of alibi at his trial, which was held on 
November 21 and 22, 1978. Five witnesses, including 
appellant, testified in his behalf. At the conclusion 
of the trial the jury found him guilty as charged. 
Appellant's family subsequently retained the 
counsel bringing this appeal. The appeal was filed in 
this Court on February 28, 1979. After the appeal was 
filed here and long after the time for making a motion 
for a new trial had expired a witness who was not known 
to the appellant carne forward with information corroborating 
the alibi defense raised at trial. Appellant's counsel 
sought a new trial in the court below by way of a petition 
for a writ of coram nobis which set forth the new information. 
The petition was dismissed, the Court having ruled that there 
was no legal justification for the issuance of the writ. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the verdict and 
judgment below on the grounds that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain a finding of guilt. In the 
alternative appellant seeks a new trial for several reasons. 
Appellant contends that a new trial should be held because 
the lower court erred in admitting a photocopy of a composite 
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drawing created by the robbery victim rather than the 
original. Also, the identification of the defendant in a 
photographic lineup was impermissably suggestive. Finally, 
the lower court improperly rejected the petition for a 
writ of coram nobis. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 29, 1978, a Texaco station in Orem, Utah, 
owned by one, Leo Carter, was robbed of approximately 
$143.00. The robbery was accomplished by a person who 
struck the attendant, Jared Harper, in the head with an 
object. While Mr. Harper lay stunned, the perpetrator 
took the money from the cash register. 
Appellant was charged with this offense. He raised 
the defense of alibi (record 43). At the trial, the victim 
testified that on the same evening as the crime, an 
individual had come in to the station on foot about 8:00 
to 8:30 P.M. (transcript 15). He described this person as 
wearing blue jeans and a red pullover t-shirt (T-15). He 
had a neatly trimmed beard, was shorter than Harper, had a 
somewhat prominent nose, and was muscular (T-35). Mr. 
Harper engaged this individual in a conversation for 
approximately two or three minutes (T-35) and the person 
then left the station, again on foot. At trial, Mr. 
Harper identi=ied this person as the appellant (T-14). 
According to the testimony of Harper, the same 
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person returned to the station that evening at 9:55 P.M. 
(T-16). He asked for change for the pop machine and as 
Harper turned to get it, he struck him in the head. Harper 
fell to the floor and the person took the money (T-17, 18). 
During this entire time, the victim only observed the 
individual's face for 5 to 10 seconds (T-35). 
The next day Harper met with an Orem police officer, 
Tim Berhow, to discuss the crime. Harper gave Detective 
Berhow a description of his assailant (T-38) and they 
began to prepare a composite drawing. The composite, like 
all composites, was prepared by Harper selecting from 
various facial features those which appeared most like 
the person he had seen that night. The features are then 
assembled into a facial likeness (T-56, 57). The original 
prepared by Harper was disassembled, but, over defendant's 
objection, that it was not the best evidence (T-74-78), a 
photocopy of the drawing was admitted into evidence. 
The next stage in the identification process 
was for Detective Berhow to show Harper 8 photographs only 
5 of which could have possibly been suspects (T-44). Harper 
selected the appellant's photograph from these. 
At trial, 5 witnesses, including the appellant 
testified in support of an alibi defense. Afton Frances 
Wilson, his mother, Paul Wilson, his father, and Terry Wilson, 
his brother, all testified that the appellant had been 
-4-
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working on a car in the family yard from 7:00 P.M. 
until 9:15 to 9:20P.M. the same evening as the crime. 
Obviously, this is the same time as when Harper first 
saw the person who robbed him. At 9:15 or thereabouts 
appellant was picked up by Mitch Powell, according to each 
of the Wilsons. Mitch Powell testifed that he and the 
appellant drove to pick up Jim Hindley at his grandmother's 
house in Orem at approxiately State Street and lOth North. 
After Hindley joined them, shortly before 10:00 
P.M., they drove to Casey's Billiards in Provo, arriving 
at 10:10 P.M. They left after 10 minutes and drove to 
Reed's Billiards, where they remained until 12:30 A.M. 
Appellant's testimony was to the same effect. 
After the trial, one Jane Elsmore, grandmother 
of James Hindley and onwer of the home where he resided, 
informed the Wilsons that she could corroborate the 
testimony to the effect that Benny Wilson had come to 
her home with Mitch Powell to pick up her grandson. Appellant 
had until that time been unaware that she had been home that 
night and in any event during the time of the trial she 
was residing in Florida. Appellant's counsel desired to 
make a motion for a new trial, but was precluded from doing 
so because the time had expired and also because the record 
was on appeal. Appellant attempted to make the motion 
through the vehicle of a petition for a writ of coram nobis. 
-5-
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The lower court dismissed the petition ruling that 
appellant's contentions "did not fall within the legal 




THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE 
Appellant is well aware that he must sustain a 
heavy burden in order to satisy the Court that there 
was insufficient evidence to convict him of robbery. 
"In order for the defendant to successfully challenge and 
overturn a verdict on the ground of insuffuciency of 
the evidence, it must appear that upon so viewing the 
evidence, reasonable minds must necessarily entertain 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime," 
State v. Wilson, 565 P. 2d 66 (Utah 1977}. In the present 
case, appellant submits that he can meet that burden. 
The only issue in this case is the identity of 
the perpetrator of the crime. The State's case is grounded 
entirely upon the ability of one witness to recall the 
facial characteristics of his assailant. He had the opport-
unity to observe this person, a person he had never seen before, 
for a period of no more than three minutes on one occasion and 
no more than 10 seconds a second time that same evening. It 
is to be remembered that he also received a rather serious 
-6-
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blow to the head which might possibly have interfered 
with his ability to recall the events which transpired. 
It must also be repeated that the individual seen by Mr. 
Harper was wearing a red t-shirt. 
Mr. Harper's recollection must be balanced 
against the testimony of Paul Wilson, Frances Wilson, 
Terry Wilson, Benny Wilson and Mitch Powerll. Each one 
of the Wilsons testifed that the appellant had been in 
the yard of his own home working on a car during the entire 
time Mr. Harper first encountered the person who ultimately 
robbed him. They each testified that he had on a white 
shirt. Mitch Powell and the appellant each testified that 
they were on their way to Jim Hindley's house or on their 
way to Casey's Billiards when the robbery actually took 
place. 
Appellant recogn1zes that the judging of the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence 
is exclusively the province of the jury, State v. Wilson, 
Id., at 68. Nevertheless, appellant contends that the 
evidence here is such that reasonable minds could not have 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant 
committed this offense. The State's sole witness had only 
a fleeting opportunity to observe a person whom he had 
never seen before. In contrast, family members and a friend 
who all had known Mr. Wilson a substantial period of time 
-7-
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all placed him nowhere near the incident in question. 
The jury, in order to convict, would have had to accept 
the recollection of Harper's brief encounter as correct 
and simply concluded that the testimony given by 
defense witnesses was fabricated or the product of poor 
memories. Considering the conditions under which Harper 
had an opportunity to perceive his attacker, appellant 
argues that reasonable minds could not have reached such 
a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant, therefore, 
is entitled to have the verdict against him overturned by 
this Court on the ground that the evidence was insufficient 
to convict him. 
POINT II 
THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPELLANT 
WAS IMPERMISSABLY TAINTED AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
When this matter came to trial, Mr. Harper 
identified Mr. Wilson as the perpetrator of the crime. His 
selection of Mr. Wilson came as the apparent result of his 
opportunity to twice observe, for brief times, the person who 
robbed the gas station. However, his identification was 
heavily influenced by the process he went through with 
Detective Berhow in preparing a composite drawing and 
selecting a photograph. This process impermissably focused 
attention upon the defendant and should have been suppressed 
despite the fact no objection had been made. 
-8-
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The factors relevant to a determination of 
whether the pre-trial photo identification process was 
so impermissably suggestive as to give rise to a very 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification 
(Simmons v. ~ 390 U. S. 377 [1968]), were set out in 
State v. Wettstein, 28 U. 2d 295, 501 P. 2d 1084 (1972): 
"In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 (1967) 
the court stated that a claimed violation 
of due process of law in the conduct of 
a confrontation depends on the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding it. The 
question to be resolved is whether the 
suggestive elements in the identification 
procedure made it all but inevitable that 
the witness would identify defendant, 
whether or not he was, in fact, 'the 
man'. In Simmons v. United States, 388 
U. S. 293 (1967), the court suggested 
certain questions be considered in an 
evaluation of the totality of the circum-
stances in an identification procedure. 
First, was there justification for using 
the procedure; was there a necessity for 
using the type of identification employed; 
were the circumstances of an urgent 
character? Second, under the circumstances 
was there a chance that the procedure 
utilized would lead to misidentification? 
The court mentioned factors such as the 
opportunity and length of time that the 
witness had to observe the accused, and 
the period of time of the incident to the 
identification, i.e. was the memory still 
fresh? " 501 P. 2d 1084, 1087. 
Appellant does not challenge the need for photo 
identification in this case. A crime with some degree of 
violence had been commited and it was important that the 
police apprehend a suspect. It is appellant's contention 
that the way in which the procedure was conducted which 
-9-
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made it "all but inevitable" that appellant would be 
identified as "the man". 
Mr. Harper's opportunity to observe the suspect, 
as discussed previously, was brief, no more than a total 
of three minutes at one time and 10 seconds another, 
after which he received a hard blow to the head. This 
person was one of ma~ people who had been in the station 
that night. Twelve to eighteen hours later he was asked 
to prepare a composite drawing of one of the people he 
had seen, the one who struck him. The composite was 
prepared by selecting from a series of standard facial 
features shared by many persons. At best, it could be an 
approximation of the person he saw that night. H~s time to 
view that person was short, the blow to the head may have 
clouded his recollection, and at least half a day had elapsed 
since the incident. 
Detective Berhow thenselected eight photographs 
to show to Harper, only 5 of which could have been suspects. 
From these appellant's photograph was chosen. Superficially, it 
may appear that there was no undue suggestion. However, 
Harper had just prepared a composite drawing which could 
only bear some resemblance to the suspect. Detective Berhow 
selected photographs not which bore a resembalnce to the 
suspect, since he hadn't seen him, but which looked like the 
composite drawing. Jared Harper then selected the phot()gr2.ph 
-10-
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which appeared most like his composite drawing and which may 
have appeared something like the person he saw that night. 
It is submitted that the selection was based primarily on 
his composite drawing and not on his recollection of the 
individual he saw. That recollection must have been 
seriously impaired for the reasons discussed. 
Appellant is aware that this Court has held, 
in State v. Volberding, 30 U. 2d 257, 516 P. 359 (1973), 
that there is nothing impermissably suggestive in showing 
six to eight photographs to witnesses. Volberding does not 
apply here. There there were two witnesses, here only 
one. There the witnesses viewed the suspect for one hour, 
here for anywhere between two minutes to three minutes. 
Finally, here there was the composite drawing. 
It is the introduction of the composite drawing 
into the identification process to which appellant objects. 
Appellant recognizes that Harper testified that he would 
have identified him even without the photographic process. 
His conclusion must be balanced against the fact that he had 
very little time to see the suspect. Appellant argues that 
the composite drawing was the product of this impaired recall. 
The photos selected by Detective Berhow were selected because 
of their resemblance to the drawing. The ultimate selection 
by Harper of the appellant's photo was influenced by the 
limited pool presented to him by Berhow and because it was 
the one closest to the composite, not necessarily to the 
-11-
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person he saw. This process made it inevitable that 
appellant would be selected as he seemingly most closely 
resembled the composite prepared by Harper. The process 
so influenced Harper's recall that it must be concluded 
that when he identified appellant at trial he could 
distinguish between his memory of what happened that night 
and his memory of the drawing and the photograph which 
looked like the drawing. 
Identity was the crucial issue in this case. 
The identification of the defendant based upon this 
tainted process was so prejudicial that the Court could 
have, and should have, suppressed it although no objection 
was made. 
POINT III 
ADMISSION OF A PHOTOCOPY OF THE COMPOSITE 
DRAWING VIOLATED THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE. 
At the trial of this matter, a photocopy of 
the composite drawing just discussed was introduced as 
evidnece over appellant's objection that this was a 
violation of the best evidence rule, Rule 70 U.R.E. 
The original had been disassembled prior to the trial. 
Nevertheless, the photocopy should not have been admitted. 
The photocopy was apparently introduced to show 
how Harper had ultimately identified the appellant. If that 
was its purpose, the best evidence would have been the 
composite itself. The original would have been free from 
-12-
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any distortions in depth, light, shading, or texture 
caused by the photocopier. The jury would have had the 
actual product of Mr. Harper's memory before it to compare 
with the appellant. 
The police disassembled the original after 
making the copy, apparently with no malicious motive. 
This would appear to bring it within the exceptions of 
Rule 70. Appellant would contend, however, that where 
the proponent of the evidence knows the original is to 
serve as evidence then a duty arises to preserve it. 
Otherwise, in every case the original could be destroyed 
and the opponent would be in the difficult position of 
proving it had been done without fraudulent intent. Pro-
duction of the original here was expecially critical where 
the finding of guilt hinged on identity. Only the "best" 
evidence should be received in such a case. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED THE PETITION 
FOR A WRIT OF CORAM NOBIS. 
After this case was on appeal to this Court and 
long after the time for making a motion for a new trial 
under 77-38-4 had passed, a witness came forward who could 
corroborate his alibi defense. This witness, an elderly 
woman whom appellant did not know had seen him that 
evening, would testify that on the evening in question, at 
-13-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
approximately the time of the crime, appellant was on her 
back porch with her grandson. This is precisely where 
appellant testified he was at that hour. During the 
trial this woman was residing in Florida. She told 
appellant's family of her knowledge after this case was 
on appeal. 
The foregoing information was contained in a petition 
for a writ of coram notis which appellant filed in the lower 
court. The purposes of that writ were set out in State v. Gee, 
30 U. 2d 148, 514 P. 2d 809. In Gee, the appellant had 
sought the writ to correct assertedly improper jury conduct 
during his trial. This Court said: 
"Defendant is precluded from resorting 
to the common law, since the legislature 
has provided a remedy, a motion for a 
new trial. There is an additional 
reason that the writ may not issue: it 
would not have been available at common 
law, for coram nobis was to correct an 
error of fact. It neither issues to 
correct an error of law nor to redress 
an irregularity occurring at the trial, 
such as misconduct of the jury, court, 
or officer of the court, except under 
circumstances amounting to extrinsic 
fraud, which in effect deprived the 
petitioner of a trial on the merits. 
The writ will be issued only where it 
clearly appears that the petitioner 
had a valid defense in the facts of the 
case, which, without negligence on his 
part was not made because of duress, 
fraud or excusable mistake, or he was 
prevented from asserting or enjoying 
some legal right through duress or 
fraud or excusable neglect; and these 
facts, not appearing on the face of the 
record, if timely known, would have 
presented the rendition and entry of 
judgment." 514 P. 2d 809, 810. 
-14-
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In the present case, the lower court dismissed 
the petition without an inquiry into its merits. The 
Court ruled that the allegations contained in the 
petition fell beyond the bounds which legally justify 
the issuance of such a writ. 
The foregoing quotation from the Gee case would 
seem to mandate the opposite result, or would at least 
require the lower court to inquire into the merits of 
the petition. Appellant did not have the remedy of a 
motion for new trial. Through no fault of his own, the 
time for making the motion had expired. In any event, the 
case was on appeal to this Court and no court had jurisdiction 
to entertain the motion. 
Further, appellant was precluded from fully 
asserting his alibi defense through no fault of his own. 
He had no way of knowing this woman had seen him. She 
would have been a very effective witness for him in that 
she was not a friend nor related to him, factors the 
prosecutor used to criticize the other witnesses who 
appeared in his behalf. In closing, he made much of 
their relationships to appellant in arguing that they were 
biased. 
The Court below should have considered the merits 
of appellant's petition. Unless coram nobis is available 
in this case appellant will be placed in the position of 
having apparent grounds to at least make a motion for a 
-15-
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new trial but will have no way to present them to any 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court is presented with several alternatives 
by this appeal. First, it is requested to reverse the 
verdict below because it was based on insufficient evidence. 
If it rejects that solution, it may grant a new trial for 
one of two reasons. The identification of the appellant 
in court by the victim was the product of an impermissably 
suggestive process and should have been suppressed. The 
composite drawing, so critical to the issue of identity 
should have been produced in its original without the 
distortions of a photocopy. Finally, the Court may choose 
to require the court below to inquire into the merits of 
appellant's petition for a writ of coram nobis. This is the 
only vehicle available to the appellant to present to a 
court the evidence he claims would justify a new trial. 
He should not be deprived of a 
DATED this 9·t1-day 
' 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General for 
the State of Utah, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, this day of May, 1979. 
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